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ABSTRACT: 3e judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of Atala 
Rio and daughters v. Chile of 24 February 2012 considers that sexual orientation is included in the 
protection provided by the right to equality and non-discrimination in the American Convention 
on Human Rights. In this contribution I will re6ect on the conceptualization of sexual orientation 
as a “suspect” category in non-discrimination law and its implications. To do so, I will 7rst address 
the core meaning and purpose of the right to equality and non-discrimination and the importance 
of the distinction to be made between “suspect” and “non-suspect” classi7cations or distinctions 
(section 2). 3e next section will explore the question how to draw the line between “suspect” 
and “non-suspect” classi7cations. What are the underlying foundations for approaching a ground 
of classi7cation as suspect and how do these relate to approaching sexual orientation as a suspect 
ground (section 3)? I will conclude by returning to the Atala judgment and trying to answer the 
question how and to what extent this conceptual analysis is re6ected in the Court’s considerations 
(section 4).
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CONCEPTUALIZANDO LA ORIENTACIÓN SEXUAL COMO CATEGORÍA 
“SOSPECHOSA” EN EL DERECHO DE LA NO-DISCRIMINACIÓN: ALGUNAS 
REFLEXIONES SOBRE EL CASO ATALA DE LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE 
DERECHOS HUMANOS
RESUMEN: El fallo de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en el caso Atala Rio 
e hijas v. Chile del 24 de Febrero del 2012 considera que la orientación sexual está incluida en 
la protección proveída por el derecho a la igualdad y a la no discriminación en la Convención 
Americana de Derechos Humanos. En esta contribución re6ejaré la conceptualización de la 
orientación sexual como categoría “sospechosa” en el Derecho de la no-discriminación y sus 
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implicancias. Para hacerlo, primero abordaré el signi"cado central y el propósito del derecho a la 
igualdad y a la no discriminación, y la importancia de la distinción a hacer entre la clasi"cación 
o distinción “sospechoso” y “no-sospechoso” (sección 2). La siguiente sección explorará la pregunta 
sobre cómo dibujar la línea entre las clasi"caciones “sospechoso” y “no-sospechoso”. ¿Cuáles son las 
bases subyacentes para aproximarse a un fundamento de clasi"cación de sospecha y cómo 
éstas se relacionan para abordar la orientación sexual como motivo sospechoso (sección 3)? 
Concluiré retornando al caso Atala e intentaré responder la pregunta relativa a cómo y hasta qué 
punto este análisis conceptual está re&ejado en las consideraciones de la Corte (sección 4).
Palabras clave: orientación sexual, categoría sospechosa, derecho a la igualdad, Derecho de la no-
discriminación
1. INTRODUCTION
Sexual orientation “is not relevant when examining aspects related to an individual’s suitability 
as a parent” and “[t]he child’s best interest cannot be used to justify discrimination against the 
parents based on their sexual orientation”.1 
*ese very principled statements lie at the heart of the judgment of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights in the case of Atala Ri#o and daughters v. Chile of 24 February 2012. In this 
case Karen Atala had lost custody of her daughters because she had started living with a same-sex 
partner. Chile’s Supreme Court of Justice had held that having the daughters live with her and her 
female partner was not in the best interest of the children. *e Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights rejected this approach as is born out by the quotations above: a parent’s sexual orientation 
is not an acceptable basis for a denial of custody. 
To reach this decision, the Court considered that sexual orientation was included in the 
protection provided by the right to equality and non-discrimination in the American Convention 
on Human Rights (the Convention). Article 1.1. of the Convention obliges States Parties to ensure 
to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of the rights and freedoms of 
the Convention “without any discrimination for reasons of race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social 
condition”. *ough sexual orientation is not listed as such, the Court considered it to be included 
in the category “any other social condition”. In this way sexual orientation is acknowledged as 
meriting similar protection as race, sex and the other enumerated grounds. Like sex and race, 
sexual orientation thus seems to share the status of what may be called a “suspect” ground for 
classi"cation. With this I mean that a classi"cation or distinction based on such a ground is 
presumed to be impermissible, exceptions only being allowed in exceptional cases.2
1 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 24 February 2012, Atala Ri#o and daughters v. Chile, section 167 and 110, available 
online: http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_239_ing.pdf.
2 I use the term “suspect” in this rather general way, not in the very speci"c way in which it is used in United States case law. 
In the United States the notion of a “suspect” classi"cation is much more rigid. Race is considered to be a suspect ground for 
classi"cation, yet sex as “semi-suspect” only. I will get back to graduations of “suspectness” and their meaning in paragraph 2.3.
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In this contribution I will re!ect on the conceptualization of sexual orientation as a “suspect” 
category in non-discrimination law and its implications. To do so, I will "rst address the core 
meaning and purpose of the right to equality and non-discrimination and the importance of 
the distinction to be made between “suspect” and “non-suspect” classi"cations or distinctions 
(section 2). #e next section will explore the question how to draw the line between “suspect” 
and “non-suspect” classi"cations. What are the underlying foundations for approaching a ground 
of classi"cation as suspect and how do these relate to approaching sexual orientation as a suspect 
ground (section 3)? I will conclude by returning to the Atala judgment and trying to answer the 
question how and to what extent this conceptual analysis is re!ected in the Court’s considerations 
(section 4). 
2. EQUALITY, DISCRIMINATION AND “SUSPECT” CLASSIFICATIONS
2.1. e paradox of legal equality
A basic tenet of the modern state is the equality of all before the law. Historically, this represents 
a major achievement. For example, in Europe, inequality dominated the legal system until the 18th 
and 19th centuries, when the class society, based on the three states, was replaced by the liberal state, 
which only recognizes individual citizens who are all equal before the law. #is means that lawful 
intervention by the state can take place only on the basis of legislation, which should be applicable 
to all without distinction. #e state should not favour or disfavour speci"c individuals or groups. 
A strict application of this approach in law’s everyday reality is impossible. #e same, identical 
treatment of all people, always and everywhere, would practically prohibit legislation, as legislation 
classi"es more or less by de"nition. #is creates the so called “paradox of legal equality”: though 
all citizens are equal before the law, the law by its nature classi"es and thus di$erentiates between 
the citizens.3 As the interventions of the state in social and economic life in modern society 
increase the paradox of legal equality becomes more and more problematic and harder to solve. 
#e state classi"es increasingly on a group by group basis: workers are protected by labour law 
against employers because of di$erences in power, the tax system di$erentiates according to the 
level of income, the elderly receive old age pensions from the state. In this system, some are 
favoured, others disfavoured. #e solution to the paradox of legal equality is found in the demand 
that classi"cations should be reasonable and justi"ed. At the same time, equal treatment remains 
the “default position” so to speak; di$erential treatment needs justi"cation. #is is where the 
prohibition of discrimination comes in.
In law, the requirement of equal treatment is often formulated in terms of a prohibition to 
discriminate. #e main equality clauses in the major human rights declarations and conventions, 
such as article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), article 2 and 26 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), article 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and article 1 of the American Convention on Human 
3 See Sloot, B.P. Positieve discriminatie. (Positive discrimination; dissertation Leiden University 1986), Zwolle, Netherlands: 
Tjeenk Willink, 1986, pp. 16-19.
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Rights (ACHR) are all similar in this respect.4 !ey provide that states parties should ensure 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the said documents to all “‘without discrimination” on a 
number of grounds, such as race, sex, and religion. !e list of enumerated grounds is open-ended, 
that is it leaves room for additional grounds of discrimination to be included in the protection 
provided by the provision.5 So what does it mean for states “not to discriminate”?
2.2. Non-discrimination and non-distinguishing
!ough consensus may exist about discrimination being impermissible, no consensus exists 
concerning the issue which situations constitute discrimination: is the exclusion of same sex 
couples from marriage discrimination? Is it discriminatory to have compulsory dismissal for people 
reaching pensionable age? And how to evaluate the practice in France of not allowing pupils in 
public schools to wear any ostensible religious symbols: does that discriminate on grounds of 
religion? In all these cases we are dealing with distinctions based on sexual orientation, age and 
religion respectively that disadvantage certain groups, but does each and every such distinction 
automatically entail impermissible discrimination? As mentioned above, an absolute requirement 
of non-distinguishing would be impossible and as such does not make sense. Distinctions become 
problematic only if they cannot be justi"ed. Yet, what may constitute an acceptable justi"cation 
is bound to be a bone of contention in many cases, as the examples show. 
General non-discrimination provisions such as included in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights do not provide much to go 
by in deciding these issues. !is means that, at the end of the day, courts or other supervising 
judicial bodies (courts for short) will have to decide whether discrimination is at stake or not. !e 
question how courts do so thus becomes of paramount importance.
In general, courts indeed start from the premise that discrimination cannot be put on a par 
with non-distinguishing. Making distinctions turns problematic only if the distinctions cannot 
4 Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status (…)”; Article 2.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: “[e]
ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to 
its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”; Article 26 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: [a]ll persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal 
and eective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”; Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights: 
“[t]he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground 
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status”; Article 1.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights: “[t]he States Parties to 
this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their 
jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition”.
5 !e open-endedness of the American Convention on Human Rights lies in the possibility of interpreting the ground “any 
other social condition” in a broad way, whereas in the other human rights documents the list of grounds is explicitly rendered 
unlimited by adding the words “such as”. See for the full text of the provisions supra note 4. 
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be properly justied. As the Human Rights Committee, the supervising committee to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights put it: “the Committee observes that not every 
dierentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such dierentiation 
are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under 
the Covenant”.6 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has consistently held that 
discrimination within the meaning of article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
is engaged only if a dierence in treatment “has no objective and reasonable justication”.7 
Again, what may be considered to be “reasonable” and “objective” may dier widely. Yet, 
intuitively most people will share the feeling that some dierentiations are in need of more thorough 
justication than others. us, in the Netherlands, a man who invoked the non-discrimination 
clause of article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was met with a lot 
of ridicule when he took legal actions up to the Dutch Supreme Court to challenge the fact that the 
municipal authorities of his home town taxed dog owners but not owners of cats. ough this tax 
policy involves dierential treatment, it is not associated with anything as serious as “discrimination”.8 
Unequal treatment of owners of cats and dogs is not in any way sensitive. If, on the other hand, 
the municipality would have singled out its non-Dutch inhabitants to pay for the costs of, say, its 
integration policy, this would no doubt have created a very dierent debate: such a distinction is 
very sensitive indeed and would call for a thorough justication to be acceptable, if at all. In several 
jurisdictions this dierence between “sensitive” or “suspect” grounds of dierentiation and non-
sensitive/non-suspect grounds has resulted in a specic way of reviewing discrimination claims. 
2.3. Some grounds of dierentiation are more suspect than others
e classic example of a dierentiated approach to the grounds on which a dierentiation or 
distinction is based can be found in United States constitutional law. e Supreme Court employs 
three dierent tests to decide discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution.9 e strictest one or so called “strict scrutiny” test is applied where 
truly “suspect” classications are involved and requires the challenged classication to pursue a 
“compelling state interest” and to be “necessary” to achieve it. According to the Supreme Court, 
race surely belongs to this category and applying the “strict scrutiny” test is almost always fatal 
for the classication involved. A somewhat more lenient test is applied where “semi-suspect” 
classications are concerned. Classications based on sex are held to belong to this category. For 
classications to survive this level of “intermediate scrutiny” the classication has to serve “an 
6 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination, 10 November 1989, available online: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/453883fa8.html.
7 e classic case in this respect is the Belgian Linguistics case, European Court of Human Rights, 23 July 1968, Publ. ECrtHR, 
Series A, no. 6.
8 e case was discussed in Wattel, P.J. “De reikwijdte van fundamentele rechten in belastingzaken” (e scope of fundamental rights 
in tax cases), in: Reikwijdte van fundamentele rechten, Preadviezen van de NJV 1995 (e scope of fundamental rights, Advisory 
opinions of the Dutch Association of Jurists 1995). Zwolle, the Netherlands: Tjeenk Willink 1995, pp. 175-221 at p. 186.
9 ough, the division between the three tiers may not be always as strict in practice. Besides, other aspects of the case, such as the 
other rights or interests aected, will also in*uence the intensity of the review to be applied, see for an overview Gerards, J.H. 
Rechterlijke toetsing aan het gelijkheidsbeginsel, e Hague, the Netherlands: Sdu Uitgevers BV, 2002. (Also available translated 
into English as Judicial Review in Equal Treatment Cases, the Hague, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijho, 2005).
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important governmental objective” instead of a “compelling interest” and to be “substantially 
related” to that objective, instead of being “necessary”. !e test thus leaves more room for 
justifying the classi"cation. !e third or “rational basis” test is very deferential and is applied to 
classi"cations which are not deemed (semi)suspect in any way. Such classi"cations generally pass 
judicial muster unless they are utterly unreasonable. 
In Europe, similar developments dierentiating between grounds of discrimination are 
under way. First of all, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights merits attention. 
According to established case law, for the purposes of article 14 ECHR a dierence of treatment 
is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justi"cation, that is if it does not pursue 
a legitimate aim or if there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means 
employed and the aim sought to be realised.10 Under this test the Contracting States are generally 
left a wide margin of appreciation, yet certain distinctions have proven to merit closer scrutiny by 
the Court. us in a case involving a claim of sex discrimination the Court held that as “(…) the 
advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of the Council 
of Europe (…) very weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a di!erence in treatment on 
the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the Convention”.11 
is approach has been followed in other sex discrimination cases and has also been applied to 
distinctions on the basis of nationality and sexual orientation.12 e latter is remarkable as neither 
nationality nor sexual orientation are enumerated in article 14 ECHR. e higher protection 
o!ered to sexual orientation has been a"rmed in a consistent line of cases:
“(…) the Court has held repeatedly that, just like di!erences based on sex, di!erences based 
on sexual orientation require particularly serious reasons by way of justi#cation.”13 
Concerning discrimination on grounds of race the European Court appears to have taken an 
even stricter approach. In the case of D.H and others v. the Czech Republic, which concerned the 
treatment of Roma children in the education system, the Court held that racial discrimination is 
“a particularly invidious kind of discrimination” which entails the closest kind of scrutiny: 
“Where the di!erence in treatment is based on race, colour or ethnic origin, the notion of 
10 European Court of Human Rights, 23 July 1968, Belgian Linguistics case, Series A 6, par. 41. For an overview of the case law 
under article 14 see Van Dijk, P.,Van Hoof, F., Van Rijn, A. and Zwaak, L. (eds), !eory and practice of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, Antwerp/Oxford: Intersentia 2006, pp. 1027-1051.
11 European Court of Human Rights, 28 May 1985, Abdulaziz, Cabalis and Balkandali, Series A 94, par. 78. (emphasis added)
12 For nationality see European Court of Human Rights, 16 September 1996, Gaygusuz v. Austria, appl. no. 17371/90; for sexual 
orientation see European Court of Human Rights, 9 January 2003, L. and V. v. Austria, appl. no. 39392/98 and 39829/98.
13 European Court of Human Rights, 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, appl.no. 30141/04. e Human Rights Committee 
took a di!erent approach with a similar e!ect. In the landmark case Toonen, an Australian case, which was brought to the 
Human Rights Committee under the individual complaints procedure of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, the Committee 
held sexual orientation to be included in the protection against sex discrimination as provided for by the ICCPR in articles 2 and 
26 ICCPR; see Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994), speci#cally 
section 8.7. 
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objective and reasonable justication must be interpreted as strictly as possible”.14 
In the Netherlands, Dutch highest courts also have clearly started to adopt a dierentiated 
approach to discrimination claims depending on the ground of discrimination at stake. Already in 
1993 the Centrale Raad van Beroep (the supreme court of appeal in administrative cases) explicitly 
formulated such an approach in a case involving age discrimination. In this case a law professor 
claimed that his mandatory retirement upon reaching the pensionable age of 65 violated, among 
others, article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. is provision has 
direct eect in the Netherlands. e Centrale Raad van Beroep upheld his dismissal by accepting 
the arguments put forward for this policy.15 An important element in its assessment regarded 
the fact that age, contrary to, for instance, race or sex, is not enumerated among the grounds 
of discrimination mentioned in article 26. e Raad held that this suggests a “value dierence” 
which aects the level of scrutiny to be applied by the reviewing court. So generally speaking, 
classications on the ground of age are in need of a less exacting justication than, for instance, 
classications on the basis of sex or race. Under this more lenient test the policy could be justied.
For quite some time, the Hoge Raad, the Dutch Supreme Court, has been much more implicit 
about the levels of scrutiny it applies, but now it seems to be rmly dedicated to a similar line of 
reasoning.16 To start with, the Supreme Court applies a lenient test in the many tax law cases it 
has to deal with under article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. e 
far majority of those claims involve rather trivial distinctions or classications, which seem to be 
far removed from the enumerated grounds of discrimination in article 26. us for instance, the 
distinction mentioned above between taxing owners of dogs and owners of other pets has been 
challenged, as well as dierences in tax deductions between employees who make private use of a 
company car in excess of 1000 kilometres or less. 
Interestingly, the supervising committee to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the Human Rights Committee, was presented with the opportunity to give its views on the 
latter Dutch tax case under the individual complaints procedure. Contrary to the Dutch Supreme 
Court, the Human Rights Committee did not get to the stage of applying any justication test 
at all, as the Committee deemed the claim as such to fall outside the scope of application of 
article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: “(…) the Committee 
considers that the author has not substantiated how his dierent treatment was based on one of 
the prohibited grounds of discrimination enumerated in article 26, or on any comparable ‘other 
status’ referred to in that article”. Consequently, the complaint was held to be inadmissible.17 
Apparently the Human Rights Committee did not consider the distinction to amount to an issue 
14 European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), 13 November 2007, D.H. and others v. the Czech Republic, appl.no. 
57325/00.
15 Centrale Raad van Beroep, 4 November 1993, Administratiefrechtelijke Beslissingen 1994, 213 (m.nt. H.Ph.J.A.M. Hennekens).
16 For a brief overview see Loenen, Titia. “Leeftijdsdiscriminatie” (Discrimination on grounds of age), in: Barkhuysen, T., Polak, 
J.E.M., Schueler, B.J, and Widdershoven, R.J.G.M., AB-Klassiek - sixth edition-, Deventer, the Netherlands: Kluwer 2009, 
pp. 317-326.
17 Human Rights Committee, 25 July 2005, communication no. 1192/2003. Available online through the website of the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/.
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of “real” discrimination to start with, yet why this is the case is not fully explained. I would submit 
it is because the Committee indeed regarded the ground of di!erentiation as not being sensitive or 
suspect in any way; that is as too trivial to provide a basis for a discrimination claim.
When claims of age discrimination are at stake the Dutch Supreme Court also applies a rather 
lenient test. Like the Centrale Raad van Beroep it upheld the policy of mandatory retirement upon 
reaching pensionable age at 65.18 In a 2004 judgment dealing with a very similar issue it explicitly 
mentioned in this respect that it has to be born in mind that a distinction on the ground of age is 
not, by de"nition, a suspect distinction like a distinction based on grounds of race or sex.19 us 
it explicitly recognizes a di!erence in judicial review between suspect and non-suspect (or at least 
less suspect) classi"cations.20
#e next question to be answered is, of course: if not all grounds of discrimination are equally 
suspect, which ones are and on what basis can they be deemed to di!er? 
3. FOUNDATIONS FOR IDENTIFYING “SUSPECT” GROUNDS OF 
DIFFERENTIATION
As can be inferred from the above examples from the case law in several jurisdictions, legal 
listings of grounds of discrimination give some indication of “suspectness”, but apparently are not 
conclusive. 
To start with, as the prohibition of discrimination in the major human rights documents 
mentioned is not limited to the grounds listed it may include other grounds as a matter of 
principle. As mentioned before, under the European Convention on Human Rights nationality 
and sexual orientation have been included as protected grounds. Any distinction that is based 
on those grounds is subject to stricter scrutiny than “ordinary” distinctions: only very weighty or 
particularly serious reasons can provide a justi"cation.
#e other way round, being one of the enumerated grounds in a non-discrimination provision 
does not automatically entail a strict review of a distinction based on that ground. For example, 
in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights classi"cations on grounds of religion 
have often been met with a very marginal review by the European Court of Human Rights. 
Instead of closely reviewing such cases, the Court often leaves the States Parties to the European 
Convention of Human Rights a very wide margin of appreciation in regulating religion and 
religious expressions. #e cases concerning dress codes banning religious symbols in public 
education in Turkey and France provide a good illustration. #e bans were easily upheld by a very 
18 Hoge Raad 1 November 2002, LJN: AE7356.
19 Hoge Raad 8 October 2004, LJN: AP0424, consideration 3.4.2.
20 Approaching distinctions on the ground of age as less suspect than those on grounds of race or sex is supported by the case law of 
the European Court of Justice. In the Spanish case Palacios de la Villa the European Court of Justice, by applying a rather lenient 
test, also upheld the policy of compulsory retiring employees who turn 65. See European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), 16 
October 2007, Palacios de la Villa (case C-411/05).
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deferential court.21 In those cases, religion is clearly not approached as a ground of classication 
which requires as such close judicial scrutiny. 
"e conclusion would seem to be that being mentioned in the list of grounds is not in itself 
a determining criterion for the suspectness of a ground of discrimination and the accompanying 
stricter review of a classication based on that ground. Yet, being mentioned suggests the criterion 
is in some way “sensitive”; otherwise it would not seem to make sense to have it included in the 
list to start with. In this respect it seems better to think in terms of degrees of suspectness of certain 
classications and degrees of closer judicial review than in terms of any rigid scheme of “suspect” 
and “non-suspect” grounds of discrimination. 
"is brief exploration of the meaning of being listed or not in the enumeration of discrimination 
grounds in non-discrimination provisions has so far evaded the question as to the underlying, 
conceptual foundation for qualifying a ground of dierentiation as to some degree suspect in 
one way or another. In the following I discuss four foundations for “suspectness” that recur in 
scholarly literature. Some refer to the characteristics connected to the ground of dierentiation 
itself; others derive from the social and economic position of the groups aected.
3.1. Immutable characteristics
A !rst criterion to mention here for identifying suspect grounds of di#erentiation focuses 
on the immutability of certain personal characteristics. "is criterion is a familiar one in United 
States jurisprudence.22 Race and sex, for example, are biological facts, independent of free choice 
and as such cannot be changed at will. Di#erential treatment on grounds of something that is 
so clearly beyond a person’s in$uence would seem to be presumptively unfair and thus suspect. 
Even if nowadays no absolute barriers exist anymore to a change of sex, as is born out by the 
possibilities of gender reassignment, regarding sex as an immutable characteristic still holds true 
as long as sex change requires extremely intrusive and costly surgery. "e same would be true of 
current possibilities to change the visible features of a person’s race. "ough we may not be able 
to perceive sex and race as absolutely immutable categories anymore, they are still characterized 
by what has been termed “e#ective immutability”.23
Taking the immutability of personal characteristics as the foundation for identifying suspect 
grounds of di#erentiation is not without its problems. Firstly, it seems evident that not each and 
every immutable personal characteristic merits this status. Intelligence, for instance, is a highly 
immutable and personal characteristic, yet it is generally not regarded as a suspect ground for 
di#erentiation. Quite the contrary, it is deemed highly relevant and accepted as a proper criterion 
21 See for the Turkish ban European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), 10 November 2005, Sahin v. Turkey, appl. no. 
44774/98; for the French ban see European Court of Human Rights, 30 June 2009: on Muslim women’s complaints Aktas v. France, 
appl. no. 43563/08; Bayrak v. France, appl. no. 14308/08; Gamaleddyn v. France, appl. no. 18527/08; Ghazal v. France, appl. no. 
29134/08; on complaints by Sikh pupils Javir Singh v. France, appl. no. 25463/08; Ranjit Singh v. France, appl. no. 27561/08.
22 Shapiro, M.R. “Treading the Supreme Courts murky immutability waters”, in: Gonzaga Law Review, vol. 38, 2002-2003, pp. 
409-443.
23 Ibid.
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for access to all kinds of jobs, even if it entails the exclusion of less intelligent people. Apparently 
“immutability” in itself is not su!cient to render a personal characteristic into a suspect ground 
of di"erentiation.
Another problem concerns assessing whether a characteristic is immutable to start with. Sexual 
orientation provides a good example. Medical and other scientists are not agreed on the answer 
to the question whether one is born with a speci#c sexual orientation or not.24 Regardless the 
right answer, sexual orientation tends to be a focal point of a person’s identity. Even if it could be 
considered the result of some kind of act of will, this means it would be extremely hard to change 
it; or at least not without great cost to the person involved. $is brings us to a second foundation 
for distinguishing suspect from non-suspect grounds of classi#cation: the ground constitutes an 
identity marker par excellence. 
3.2. Identity markers
A much quoted characterization of discrimination in Dutch constitutional history reads as 
follows:
“Discrimination concerns groups that, as a group, are characterized by attributes the members 
of the group either cannot lay aside in any way (such as race or sex), or cannot lay aside without 
damaging their individual personality (such as religion, belief or political conviction)”.25
$is characterization highlights the importance of certain characteristics for the constitution 
of the very core of a person’s identity and for what a person may hold most dear or even sacred in 
his or her life and life project. Disregard for this pivotal importance of a characteristic for personal 
identity would seem to be unacceptable.
$e description cited above provides an indication of the kind of characteristic to be regarded 
as an identity marker: religion or belief and political conviction. In addition to these characteristics 
several others would seem to qualify for belonging to the core of a person’s identity, such as race 
and sex. $is shows a clear overlap may exist between the #rst and the second foundation for 
“suspectness” distinguished so far.
Sexual orientation no doubt also belongs to the category “identity marker”. As the Canadian 
Supreme Court put it:
“[W]hether or not sexual characteristics are based on biological or psychological factors, 
which may be a matter of some controversy, it is a deeply personal characteristic that is either 
24 See more extensively Richards, D.A.J. Identity and the case for gay rights. Race, gender, religion as analogies. Chicago/London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999.
25 $e original Dutch reads: “[d]iscriminatie heeft betrekking op groepen die àls groep worden gekenmerkt door attributen die de 
leden van de groep óf überhaupt niet kunnen a?eggen (zoals ras of geslacht) ófwel niet kunnen a?eggen zonder daarmee schade 
te berokkenen aan de eigen persoonlijkheid (zoals godsdienst, levensovertuiging of politieke gezindheid).” (Translation by the 
author). Quoted in Burkens, M.C., “Gelijke behandeling (art.1.1)” (Equal treatment), in: Koekkoek, A.K., Konijnenbelt, 
W. and Crijns, F.C.L.M., (red.), Grondrechten: commentaar op hoofdstuk I van de herziene Grondwet (Fundamental rights: a 
commentary on chapter I of the revised Constitution), Nijmegen, the Netherlands: Ars Aequi Libri, 1982, pp. 49-65. 
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unchangeable or changeable only at unacceptable personal costs, and so falls within the ambit 
of s. 15 protection”.26 
An important question concerns the scope of the category “identity marker”. If being an 
“identity marker” is decisive for regarding religion and belief as deserving the protection of the 
right to non-discrimination, should this protection not equally apply to less conventional identity 
markers? To give an example: if an orthodox Christian can bring a discrimination claim for being 
refused a job because he cannot meet the employer’s requirement to work on Sundays, as is the 
case in the Netherlands, should it not follow that a devoted soccer fan, say an Ajax-supporter 
whose entire life is organised around his favourite club, can do the same if he wants to attend all 
Sunday matches? Under Dutch non-discrimination law his chances of a successful claim would be 
nil and I would expect this to be the same in other jurisdictions. As was the case with the criterion 
“immutability”, apparently the importance of a characteristic for shaping a person’s identity is not 
in itself a suciently determining factor for rendering a ground of dierentiation suspect.
3.3. (A history of ) structural and pervasive disadvantage
A third conceptual foundation for identifying a classication as “suspect” is linked to the 
social and economic position of the group aected by the classication rather than to any 
characteristic of the ground as such. In this approach, classications resulting in structural 
and pervasive disadvantage or exclusion of specic groups in society are the problem against 
which non-discrimination provisions intend to provide protection. "is line of thinking in fact 
takes historical and social experience in the real world as its starting point, non-discrimination 
provisions being its legal response: 
“Grounds of discrimination are not purely legal constructs. "ey re#ect a political and social 
reality to which law has, belatedly, given recognition. Discrimination was a fact of life long 
before the law decided that it should intervene to prohibit it.”27 
"is is to say that the existence of factual oppression and/or disadvantage of certain groups 
in society precedes the prohibition of discrimination on a specic ground and provides its very 
foundation. "is foundation thus focuses on the members of vulnerable groups in society who 
share a certain characteristic that is the basis for their inferior position. It generally concerns 
groups lacking the in#uence or power to defend themselves against structural and pervasive forms 
of disadvantage and oppression by other, more dominant groups. "e most obvious of such 
historically and structurally disadvantaged groups are racial or ethnic minorities (which exactly 
will of course depend on the context in any given society) and women.
"is foundation for identifying specic grounds of classication as “suspect” plays a 
26 “Section 15” contains the Canadian constitutional prohibition of discrimination; Supreme Court of Canada, Egan v. Canada 
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 513.
27 Pothier, D., “Connecting grounds of discrimination to real people’s real experiences”, in: Canadian Journal of Women and Law 
2001, pp. 37-73, at p. 41.
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particularly prominent role in Canadian and South African jurisprudence.28 As the South African 
Constitutional Court put it, the grounds of discrimination explicitly protected in the South 
African Constitution share the fact 
“that they have been used (or misused) in the past (both in South Africa and elsewhere) to 
categorize, marginalize and often oppress persons who have had, or who have been associated 
with these attributes or characteristics”.29 
At the same time, the Court acknowledges that historical disadvantage and oppression cannot 
be regarded as the one and only foundation for a classication to be included in the protection 
provided by the equality and non-discrimination provisions. Otherwise this would imply that 
whites in South-Africa would be deprived of this protection, which would be unacceptable. "us 
the South-African Constitutional Court held that a municipality infringes the non-discrimination 
clause by taking action against white citizens only for not paying for certain services and letting 
black ones o# the hook.30
3.4. Prejudice, stereotyping and hostility
A fourth foundation for regarding a speci!c ground of classi!cation “suspect” also ties in 
with the social position of the groups a#ected by it. If a group su#ers from prejudice, negative 
stereotyping and/or stigmatisation attributed to the characteristic its members share, or encounters 
outright hostility due to it, a classi!cation based on that characteristic should be approached with 
suspicion.31
"e negative impact of group based prejudice and stereotyping on the individual members of 
the groups concerned has been abundantly researched in the social sciences.32 Members of the 
groups a#ected are perceived as inferior by the dominant ones on the basis of (mostly negative) 
characteristics that are attributed to them. "is sets them apart from other people and is used as 
justi!cation for their exclusion from all kinds of opportunities and advantages. It is extremely hard 
for individuals belonging to such groups to break through this mechanism. "ey may even start 
perceiving themselves as truly inferior. "us, for example, women all over the world have su#ered 
from being perceived as mothers and carers only, un!t for public life and public functions. 
"is foundation for regarding a ground of classi!cation suspect is also most prominently 
28 See for an overview of the Canadian case law Hogg, P.W., Constitutional law of Canada, Scarborough, Ontario: "omson/
Carswell, 2007; for the South-African case law see Motala, Z. and Ramaphosa, C., Constitutional law. Analysis and cases, 
Oxford/Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 2002.
29 Harksen v. Lane and others, 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC); 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC).
30 City Council of Pretoria v. Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC); 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC).
31 According to some authors, stigma constitutes the core of discrimination; see e.g. Solanke, I., “Stigma: a limiting principle 
allowing multiple consciousness in anti-discrimination law?”, in: Schiek, D., and Chege, V. (eds), European Union non-
discrimination law. Comparative perspectives on multidimensional equality law, London/New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009, 
pp. 115-136.
32 See e.g. Ellemers, N., Spears, R. and Doosje, B. “Self and social identity”, in: Annual Review of Psychology vol. 53, 2002, pp. 
161-186.
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and explicitly referred to in Canadian and South African jurisprudence. To quote the Canadian 
Supreme Court, the purpose of the prohibition of discrimination is “to prevent the violation of 
essential human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or 
political or social prejudice”.33
!is foundation is often closely linked to the foundation mentioned in the last section, but 
they do not always coincide or overlap completely. !e prejudice and stereotyping encountered by 
older workers provides an example. !ough this leads to speci"c forms of age based disadvantage 
and exclusion in the labour market, it would seem to be an overstatement to say that older 
workers as a group encounter pervasive and structural oppression and disadvantage. 
To conclude, we might say that dierent elements or criteria may be relevant to identify a 
ground of classi"cation as “suspect”. No single foundation seems to provide a generally accepted 
and satisfying conceptual basis in itself. Yet, the four foundations taken together seem to provide 
a very useful point of departure for re$ecting on the degree to which grounds of classi"cation 
should be considered “suspect” and merit stricter judicial review. I would say that the more a 
ground of di#erentiation meets the criteria for “suspectness” that $ow from the four foundations 
mentioned taken together, the more reason to apply strict judicial scrutiny.
A "nal remark on the topic of foundations concerns the South-African Constitutional Court’s 
attempt to overcome the problematic questions raised by the various foundations explored in 
this section. !e Court does so by identifying “the potential to impair human dignity” as the 
quintessence of accepting a di#erentiation as coming within the purview of discrimination 
analysis, whether it is an enumerated ground or not.34 In line with one of the main points of 
criticism voiced against taking human dignity as a yardstick I would submit that the criterion of 
“human dignity” is too malleable and vague to provide a theoretically sound foundation in itself. 
!ough human dignity no doubt is central to the notion of equality and non-discrimination, as 
it is to the very notion of human rights as such, the concept is too abstract to give much concrete 
guidance.35 Nevertheless, the South African Court’s approach does bring across the message 
that discrimination is about something “serious” that strikes at the core of what human rights 
protection is about. In this respect a reference to dignity may help to ward o# the danger pointed 
out in scholarly literature of “trivializing” the concept of discrimination by including more and 
more grounds in the list of protected grounds.36 For sure, distinctions between owners of cats and 
dogs in local tax policies should not be put on a par with distinctions based on race or sex. 
33 Law v. Canada [999] 1 S.C.R. 497, par. 51.
34 For an overview of the relationship between human dignity and equality in the South-African legal context see Grant, E. 
“Dignity and Equality”, in: Human Rights Law Review, 2007, pp. 299-329.
35 See in addition to the literature mentioned in the previous note e.g. Grabham, E. Law v. Canada: new directions for equality 
under the Canadian Charter? In: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 22, no. 4, 2002, pp. 641-661; Rao, N. On the use and 
abuse of dignity in constitutional law. In: Columbia Journal of European Law, vol. 14, no. 2, 2008, pp. 201-256; Small, J. and 
Grant, E. “Dignity, discrimination, and context: new directions in South African and Canadian human rights law”, in: Human 
Rights Review, 2005, pp. 25-63.
36 See e.g. Holtmaat, R. “Stop de in$atie van het discriminatiebegrip!” (Stop the in$ation of the concept of discrimination!), in: 
Nederlands Juristenblad, 2003, vol. 78, no. 25, pp. 1266-1276.
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4. GROUNDING SEXUAL ORIENTATION AS A SUSPECT CATEGORY IN ATALA
If we return to Atala, how are the conceptual approaches distinguished above re!ected in the 
case and in the judgment of the Inter-American Court? On which of the four foundations is the 
status of sexual orientation as a strongly protected category under the non-discrimination clause 
of the American Convention on Human Rights based? Overall, the second and third foundations 
for according sexual orientation this status seem to stand out: sexual orientation is clearly seen as 
an identity marker and the Court fully acknowledges that homosexuals suer from prejudice and 
negative stereotyping in many ways.
As far as sexual orientation as an important part of personality is concerned, the Inter-
American Court refers with approval to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in 
which sexual orientation is identi#ed as a characteristic that is “innate or inherent to the person”.37 
Importantly, because of this prime importance of sexual orientation to an individual’s identity 
and life project it is not just being homosexual which is protected, but also expressing it, that is 
living in accordance with this identity. As a consequence, the Court does not accept the argument 
of the Chilean Supreme Court that Karen Atala should have refrained from living with her same-
sex partner because this was allegedly in the best interest of her children:
“(…) the Court considers that the prohibition of discrimination due to sexual orientation 
should include, as protected rights, the conduct associated with the expression of homosexuality. 
Furthermore, if sexual orientation is an essential component of a person’s identity, it was not 
reasonable to require Ms. Atala to put her life and family project on hold in order to allegedly 
protect her daughters.”38
$e prejudice and negative stereotyping homosexuals su"er from is referred to in many places 
in the judgment. Firstly, the idea that growing up with same-sex parents leads to a “confusion of 
sex roles” that is detrimental to a healthy psychological development of children is put aside by the 
Court as based on an “unfounded preconception”.39 In this context the Court refers to the fact that 
many social science research reports provide evidence that the identity formation and emotional 
well being of children raised by same-sex parents and by heterosexual parents is comparable. No 
evidentiary basis exists for speculations about future harm to a child’s development if it grows up 
in a lesbian or gay household.40
In addition, the Court rejects in a principled way stereotypical and traditional notions of what 
constitutes a proper and “normal” family as alien to the American Convention on Human Rights. 
It #nds
“(…) that the language used by the Supreme Court of Chile regarding the girls’ alleged need 
37 Atala-judgment, supra note 1, section 87.
38 Ibid, section 139.
39 Ibid, section 125.
40 Ibid, sections 126-129.
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to grow up in a ‘normally structured family that is appreciated within its social environment’, 
and not in an ‘exceptional family’, re!ects a limited, stereotyped perception of the concept of 
family, which has no basis in the Convention, since there is no speci"c model of family (the 
‘traditional family’).”41
An interesting remark on stereotypical perceptions of the role of women is made as a response 
to the Chilean Supreme Courts’ argument that Karen Atala should have placed her own interests 
in living with her partner second to the interest of her children. #e Court rejects this argument 
as implying a traditional concept of women’s social role as mothers, “according to which it is 
socially expected that women bear the main responsibility for their children’s upbringing and that 
in pursuit of this she should have given precedence to raising her children, renouncing an essential 
aspect of her identity.”42 
Most importantly of all, perhaps, the Court rejects giving in to prejudice and stereotyping 
even if this would perhaps indeed have a detrimental e$ect on the children because of the social 
discrimination su$ered by Karen Atala’s children due to the persistence of negative attitudes 
towards homosexuals in society. On the contrary, the state should actively engage such attitudes 
and try to change them:
“While it is true that certain societies can be intolerant toward a person because of their race, 
gender, nationality, or sexual orientation, States cannot use this as justi"cation to perpetuate 
discriminatory treatments. States are internationally compelled to adopt the measures necessary 
‘to make e$ective’ the rights established in the Convention, as stipulated in Article 2 of said 
Inter-American instrument, and therefore must be inclined, precisely, to confront intolerant 
and discriminatory expressions in order to prevent exclusion or the denial of a speci"c status.”43
Of the four possible foundations for rendering sexual orientation a suspect category, 
“immutability” and “a history of structural and pervasive disadvantage” hardly "gure in the Atala 
case. #e Court does not pronounce itself on the sensitive issue whether homosexuality is an 
immutable characteristic or a matter of some kind of choice. Apparently there is no need to do so, 
given the importance attached to sexual orientation as a crucial identity marker. As for the fourth 
foundation, the presence of “a history of structural and pervasive disadvantage” is referred to but 
does not play a prominent role in the Atala case.44 #is may be explained by the fact that even if 
it no doubt also applies to homosexuals (the worldwide prevalence of sodomy laws being a clear 
manifestation), it does so in a rather peculiar way. Women or racial minorities usually have not 
been able to escape structural and pervasive disadvantage simply because of the visibility of the 
characteristic that has been and often still is the basis for their oppression. Homosexuals, however, 
need not su$er from social or economic exclusion and disempowerment if they hide their sexual 
41 Ibid, section 145.
42 Ibid, section 140.
43 Ibid, section 119.
44 For instance, in section 92 the Court remarks that alleged lack of consensus in some countries regarding full respect for the rights 
of homosexuals cannot be considered a valid argument “to perpetuate and reproduce the historical and structural discrimination 
that these minorities have su$ered”.
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orientation (and in fact many have done so in the past and still do). In that sense, homosexuals as 
a group do not constitute a socially and economically deprived class in the way we can say women 
and racial minorities in many societies do.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In its rst judgment on sexual orientation, the Inter-American Court has recognized the 
protected status of sexual orientation under the non-discrimination clause of the American 
Convention on Human Rights. Conceptually, sexual orientation is identied as a “suspect” 
ground of dierentiation. To arrive at this conclusion two conceptual foundations mentioned 
in legal scholarship seem to have played a particularly important role in the Court’s approach. 
Sexual orientation is to be regarded as a suspect ground for dierentiation because it is a core part 
of personal identity and of the way in which a person gives meaning to his or her life project. I 
would say this is the most important reason why sexual orientation is to be regarded as suspect 
ground. In addition, it is to be considered suspect because homosexuals have suered all kinds 
of detrimental and damaging treatment due to the prejudice and stereotyping attached to this 
characteristic. Any distinction based on sexual orientation should therefore be regarded with great 
suspicion. 
Apart from its principled message, the importance of this judgment lies in its consequences 
for judicial review of distinctions based on sexual orientation. Such distinctions are presumptively 
invalid and can only be accepted if the justications provided meet a test of strict scrutiny.45 is 
approach will surely not cut short all discussions on dierential treatment of homosexuals and 
heterosexuals, but it does change the terms of the debate. e exclusion of homosexuals from all 
kinds of material and immaterial benets requires a very thorough justication that cannot be 
based on presumed characteristics and stereotypical notions about them. e burden of proof lies 
with those who want to exclude homosexuals, not the other way round. is is what the non-
discrimination clause in human rights treaties and declarations is indeed all about.
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